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THE KINSEY REPORTS AND THE LEGAL MIND
WALTER 0.

WEYRAUCH*

The general scope of the three books in the Kinsey Report series,'
the last one recently published, is well known. Thousands of "human
males" and "human females" were studied as to their sexual behavior.
The findings were minutely reported in an elaborate proceeding and
reduced to statistics by members of the staff of Indiana University,
under the initiative of the late Professor Alfred C. Kinsey. The project was supported by the National Research Council and financed
by the Rockefeller Foundation. It extended over many years. This
kind of mass research required, by necessity, the co-operation of many
social and professional groups, such as church groups, parent-teacher
associations, labor unions, women's dubs; and through them the cooperation of their individual members was eventually obtained. The
consequent spread of the investigation weakens somewhat the objection, frequently heard, that the findings would not be representative for the population. 2 Some shortcomings are openly admitted, as
well as the fact that statistical data cannot possibly offer more than
approximations.
*J.U.D. 1951, University of Frankfort, Germany; LL.B. 1955, Georgetown Uni-

versity; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law, University of
Florida, on leave (1958-59) in Germany for research under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.
'KINSEY, POMEROY and MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948);
KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN and GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE

(1953); GEBHARD, POMEROY, MARTIN and CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND
ABORTION (1958).

2Prof. Hans Zeisel has some objections to this mode of proceeding. He argues
that persons co-operating only under the influence of loyalty to the group chosen
for interviewing would differ in self-esteem and bias from volunteering individuals.
Book Review, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 517, 518 (1954). Admitting the correctness of
this observation, I feel that a mass research of this kind will never get started if
the researcher is overly concerned with minute details of statistics. One has to be
content with nonperfection in this field.

[277]
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The published results are addressed to various professional groups,
one of them being the law enforcement agencies. Lawyers are not
expressly mentioned in the publisher's foreword to the first volume,
unless they fall under the general classification of "others concerned
with the direction of human behavior." 3 The public, superficially
informed by popular magazines and newspapers, is mainly concerned
about those phases of the reports indicating a high frequency of male
and female homosexuality, premarital and extra-marital relations, and
abortions. Contrasted with public reaction, evidenced by numerous
letters to the press, editorials, and speeches, the average lawyer appears to be relatively unconcerned. Occupation with the findings of
the reports may very well seem to him a waste of time. He may feel
that he has little use for these findings and that they are even somewhat suspect, based on more or less irresponsible statements of persons who cannot be identified and who are not accessible for crossexamination. The whole work may appear to the lawyer as an accumulation of "hearsay" in the very meaning of the term. Statistics on
sexual behavior, he feels, should have no place in the administration
of justice. 4 This attitude may even prevail outside the courtroom in
private life and in legislation. Many a lawyer, by habit, is in a rut
of judging values in terms of evidence, trial techniques, and procedures. 5 We should not confine ourselves to this narrow approach.
More is involved than this.
Clearly these publications deal with substance which is normally
not disclosed in litigation and resulting judicial opinions, not even
those dealing with problems of marriage, divorce, or sexual crimes.
Judicial opinions are comparable in a certain sense to icebergs. Only
3KINSEY,
POMEROY and MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, C. 1
(1948).
4The Supreme Court of Florida was not hostile in the past towards using
statistics for purposes of developing new legal doctrine. The Florida dangerous
instrumentality doctrine as applied to automobiles was largely based on judicial
notice of statistics compiled by the National Safety Council and the U.S. Census
Bureau. These statistics on frequency of traffic accidents are revealing not only
as to mechanisms but also as to human behavior causing such accidents. See
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 451, 86 So. 629, 633 (1920).
5This is the plight of women married to lawyers, who may have a hard time
carrying on an intelligible conversation with their husbands without being "put
on the witness stand." Prof. Jay W. Murphy suggests that one of the merits of
the reports on sexual behavior would be to make practicing attorneys more conscious of juror selection in sex crime cases. See Book Review, 6 ALA. L. REv. 147,
154 (1953).
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one ninth of the iceberg is revealed to the eye, while the main portions are submerged dangerously below the waterline. 6 In a similar
fashion we see only a minimum of the judicial motivation in the reported opinions, even less if social taboos of a sexual nature are involved. A sexual bias is likely to be of strong motivating force to the
judge, although he is presumably not aware of it. He may spell out
in his written opinion other motivations, likely to be on a higher level
and of a legal nature, somewhat less dynamic.
We usually have a whole bundle of motivations for any single
human act or decision, many of them contradictory. This is more or
less recognized for general human behavior; but somehow, and without noticeable reason, an implied exception is made for those human
beings who sit on the bench and who address the public in their capacity as judges. What is spelled out in judicial opinions on sexual
behavior is, therefore, not necessarily sufficient for enlightenment,
certainly not for making any safe prediction for the future.
We may also consider that only a minute fraction of litigation, presumably only a small fraction of one per cent, actually reaches the
state supreme courts, and only a minority of these cases result in a
written opinion.7 The printed cases, which are so elaborately digested,
keynumbered, and shepardized, do not really represent the administration of justice. The actual practices of lower courts, particularly in
matters of sexual concern, may be amazingly different. But even actual
litigation as a whole says very little about the law in operation because the vast majority of infractions never reach the courts, or even
the law offices, and this by deliberate choice of the public. This is
very generally true. It applies for breaches of contracts, 8 bad checks,9
6The phrase is borrowed from James M. Carson, who uses it in another context
to describe the complex factors in the personality, frequently unconscious, that
may lead spouses into seeking a divorce. See THE LAW OF THE FAMILY, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE IN FLORIDA

356 (1950).

7O the total number of divorce cases decided in Florida in 1946 only 1/6 of
1%reached the Supreme Court of Florida, and even these few cases were frequently
disposed of without written opinion. CARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 327.
sSee the field research conducted by editors of the YALE LAW JOURNAL, in which
questionnaires were distributed to 200 Connecticut manufacturers. Almost all
of the manufacturers answered that they never resort to litigation as a method of
resolving their disputes. Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 1038, 1061 (1957).
9A field research in Nebraska revealed that businessmen do not bother to bring
more than three fourths of their bad checks to court. See BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALrrIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW BRANCH

OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

346 (1957).
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and, as the reports show, even more so for abortions and sexual aberrations from the standards established by our laws. 1° The general
public feels that the formal remedies of law are too clumsy, other
methods of social adjustment being much more effective. The lawyer
may very well assume the role of a man who lives in a dreamland of
his own making, a man who is better not consulted in questions of
vital concern." The issue is whether lawyers shall continue to focus
their attention on the peaks of the icebergs which appear on the
horizon in the form of reported precedent and stare decisis. As long
as we continue this path we will continue to strike substance submerged below the imaginary waterline. The three reports on sexual
behavior deal with such substance.
One of the things revealed by the first report, substantiated in the
subsequent publications, is the dichotomy between legislative and
judicial reaction to sexual issues on one side and law enforcement
on the other. Legislators and judges traditionally come from better
educated levels of the population, while the enforcement of the law
is placed in the hands of police officials, who largely come from less
educated groups.' 2 The sexual behavior pattern of each group is
quite different. Some policemen, it is asserted, frankly state that
they "consider it one of their functions to keep the judge from knowing things that he simply does not understand." 13 The judge, on the
other side, may believe that his judicial activity reflects the volume
of sexual violations, abortions, and related crimes, while actually
more than 95 per cent of the total population could have been convicted for such activities at one point or another in their lives. 1 4 The
10KINSEY, POMEROY and MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 392
(1948).
"A third-year student in one of my domestic relations classes took the position
that he would never as an attorney suggest reconciliation in marital disputes between spouses. Reconciliation would not be a "legal" alternative, and he would
not be a marriage counselor. He was, however, willing to concede that reconciliation
might involve "legal condonation of past misconduct," and he would advise his
client as to his "loss of rights" because of such condonation. The "legal" label
made all the difference in his mind.
"2See KINSEY, POMEROY and MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 389
(1948).
13Id. at 390. Lawyers as a group generally are not very appreciative of the
activities of "lower level" police officials, as evidenced by numerous legal publications.
14See KINSEY, POMEROY and MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 392
(1948).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/1

4

Weyrauch: The Kinsey Reports and the Legal Mind
KINSEY REPORTS AND THE LEGAL MIND

participation in the administration of justice of the lower educated,
but in at least certain respects more realistic, police officials may prove
to be of benefit to the general public. The general attitude of the
lower educated population toward the problem is characterized in
the first report:15
"[F]or them, there is no majesty in laws which are as unrealistic
as the sex laws. Life is a maze. The sex laws and the upper
level persons who defend them are simply hazards about which
one has to learn to find his way. Like the rough spots in a sidewalk, or the traffic on a street, the sex laws are things that one
learns to negotiate without getting into too much trouble; but
that is no reason why one should not walk on sidewalks, or
cross streets, or have sexual relations."
An example of judicial reaction illustrating some of these points
may be found in the case of Bunim v. Bunim, which was decided by

the Court of Appeals of New York in 1949.16 This case involved the
custody of two minor daughters after a divorce in which the defendant
wife admitted numerous deliberate adulteries with a married man.
Nevertheless the lower court granted her custody. The Court of Appeals modified this decision, granting custody to the plaintiff husband,
"a reputable and successful physician," because the defendant wife had
expressed in open court her considered belief in the propriety of extramarital sex experimentation by a dissatisfied wife such as herself, and
custody should not be awarded to one "who proclaims, and lives by,
such extraordinary ideas of right conduct." If we compare this judicial opinion with the findings of the second report on female behavior it seems that the very mental attitude and practices objected
to by the judge do not appear to be so extraordinary as he believed.
From the 1,702 married women interviewed, about one fourth (26%)
had had extra-marital intercourse by age forty, with some probability
that the percentage is actually higher than disclosed.17 More important for the mental attitude involved are those figures which reveal
that some 56 per cent of the married women of the sample admitting
151d. at 391.
16298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949). The examples in the text are limited
to the field of divorce and annulment litigation to illustrate the pattern of judicial reaction in a given area. Similar patterns exist in criminal proceedings.
17K NsEY, POMEROY, MARTN and GEa AR, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 416 (1953).
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extra-marital intercourse, frequently with more than one partner, expressed an intent to have more or were at least not opposed to the possibility. On the other side, 17 per cent of the married women interrogated who had not yet indulged in extra-marital relations were not opposed to the idea if an opportunity should be offered in the future. 18
The conclusion that all these marriages were quite likely on the breaking point is not borne out by facts. In about one half of the cases the
husband, in his wife's estimation, presumably did not know about
her extra-marital activities. In the remaining instances, in which the
husband learned about the relations, or at least suspected them, no
serious difficulties developed in a majority of cases. 19 This would
indicate, to put it in legal language, that most of these adulteries were
either not known to the husbands for evidentiary reasons, or if known
they were the result of connivance or were condoned. Even if we
assume that only one half of the findings are representative for the
total married female population of the United States, it is difficult
to believe that such a large segment of married women are unfit as
mothers, as the New York court postulates.2
We may note in passing, although this is an unpleasant thought,
that the husband in this case belonged as "a reputable and successful physician" to the same social and educational stratum as the
members of the court. This fact may well have influenced the ultimate
outcome in the husband's favor, although undoubtedly the judges
were not aware of such preference. This is all submerged material.
Not always are courts unaware of the realities of sexual behavior.
Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, who is from a rather conservative jurisdiction, asserted as
early as 1862 in Reynolds v. Reynolds that misrepresentation as to
chastity would not permit annulment of marriage for fraud. 21 To
require full disclosure by a woman who had once fallen from virtue
"would lead to disastrous consequences." If this were a mandate she
could never restore herself "to the rights and privileges of her sex,
and enter into matrimony without incurring the risk of being put
18Id. at 425, 431.
191d. at 434.
2OA comment on this case goes even beyond this by stating that it would not
be logical to assume that a woman can be a good mother and an adulteress at the
same time. 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 597, 599 (1949). I believe this comment can be
properly understood only if institutional patterns are considered in the light of
the strong preferences of the particular group to which the commentator belongs.
2185 Mass. (3 Allen) 605, 607 (1862) (dictum).
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22
It
away by her husband on discovery of her previous immorality."
seems that truth and public policy are not necessarily identical. Public
policy, as expressed in this case, was permitted to cover up reality.
The same type of policy may, indeed, be one of the main obstructions
in the way of an honest appraisal of the statistics on sexual behavior
discussed here. Actually, the Reynolds case was very complex and was
decided against this woman because she had not only fallen from virtue but had permitted herself to become pregnant by another man.
In addition, she was almost twice the age of the husband seeking
annulment. Thus the "truth" prevailed and the annulment was
granted.
In the fairly recent English case of Beard v. Beard Judge Vaisey
objected, in a dissenting opinion, to the soundness of the time-honored
doctrine that any condonation of past marital misconduct is conditioned upon subsequent good behavior.2 3 The English judge felt
that in the circumstances of present times there must be many husbands and wives who have erred and been taken back. Anything
other than absolute condonation would create uncertainty in marriage
and would therefore be undesirable. However, the majority based its
decision on the weight of precedent on the legal nature of condonation.
The facts presumably had much more to do with the outcome. This
particular wife had deserted her husband, a soldier returning from
war, only three weeks after he had generously condoned her adultery.
24
No wisdom or rule of law could help her.
A most striking example of judicial awareness, coupled with selfimposed restraint, was furnished by the Supreme Court of Florida in
DeBowes v. DeBowes.25 The plaintiff husband petitioned for a divorce on the basis of extreme cruelty and habitual indulgence in
violent and ungovernable temper. His wife continuously accused him
of infidelity at a time when this was without justification. The defendant wife pleaded recrimination and established by evidence that the
husband had later committed adultery. The chancellor granted the
22d. at 609.

23[1946] P. 8, 25 (C.A.).
24Although the English judge agrees in his conclusions with the findings of the
reports on sexual behavior discussed here, we should keep in mind that these
reports permit no generalization beyond the territorial limits of the United States.
In continental Europe and other parts of the world standards of morality and
sexual behavior patterns are quite different from standards and behavior in the
United States. The full impact of the difference would not necessarily be revealed
in a comparison of statistics on frequencies of certain sexual behavior.
25151 Fla. 308, 9 So.2d 632 (1942).
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divorce to the husband, and this, upon motion for rehearing, was
finally affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Judge Buford held
in an opinion which is not officially published 2 that the defendant
wife had induced her husband by her unwarranted jealousy into committing adultery and to yield to the temptation of being no better
than he was thought to be. The Court refrained from officially publishing this opinion because such publication could serve no useful
purpose. 27 Obviously the Court was conscious of the danger of adverse
publicity if it were known that a husband can prevail over his wife in
a divorce suit in spite of his own adultery. 28 This trend was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Stewart v. Stewart, again granting a divorce to the adulterous husband and dismissing the wife's counterclaim for separate maintenance. 2 9

This

opinion is officially published, but the Court was careful enough to
talk only in abstractions of law and to leave out all details of fact. We
see then that an awareness of the realities of sexual behavior alone
is not sufficient to break the social taboo. Public policy may force a
court not to disclose its motivation to the public even if such motivation is fully known to the judges.
The issue of blackmail is touched in the reports. s0 Danger of
blackmail is inherently present in most of the situations. Take adultery, for example. With the exception of New York, adultery has lost
most of its practical significance as far as divorce litigation is concerned. Easier and less obnoxious grounds are available. The threat
of basing prospective divorce litigation on adultery is used, however, by
many married women to force their husbands into alimony and property settlements in greater amounts than could otherwise be obtained.
Once the agreement is reached adultery is dropped, and the divorce
proceeds upon some minor ground.31 The mere threat of exposing
26The full text is on file with the Supreme Court of Florida. It is privately
published in CARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 541, 542. Upon rehearing the dissenting opinion by Judge Buford became the prevailing opinion.
27DeBowes v. DeBowes, 151 Fla. 308, 9 So.2d 632 (1942).
28See CARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 368, 455 n.27. The question is how does
it square with precedent and stare decisis if a court has the power to suppress publication of its own opinions in matters touching sexual taboos?
29158 Fla. 326, 29 So.2d 247 (1947).
30KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN and GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 20, 21 (1953).
31Cf. CARSON, op cit. supra note 6, at 373, 397. Prof. J. Allen Smith speaks of
the "cruel bargaining" which goes on between the spouses. The Doctrine of Recrimination in Florida, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 62 (1948). My own estimate is that the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/1

8

Weyrauch: The Kinsey Reports and the Legal Mind
KINSEY REPORTS AND THE LEGAL MIND
a prominent corespondent, even if based on unfounded assumptions,
may be sufficient to produce the desired result, particularly if the
husband is in business or otherwise active in public life. All this has
reached such a degree of general acceptance that many persons involved in such proceedings have lost the sense of impropriety. The
reports are more concerned about blackmail in other situations of
sexual behavior. Legal classifications and social taboos are tools in
the hands of the unscrupulous to achieve financial or other advantages or to destroy the reputation of the victim. All this is common
knowledge. Not known, however, is the intensity of the danger of
blackmail which, if we follow the reports, threatens almost everyone.
In view of the findings of the Kinsey Reports it has been suggested
by Professor Frederick K. Beutel that we may face an ultimate breakdown of our present morals and a tremendous human wreckage in the
form of mental traumas and emotional strains which are likely to
result from the dichotomy between our present mores and laws "based
upon the beliefs and superstitions of a pre-scientific era." Professor
Beutel suggests that lawyers, in co-operation with doctors, psychologists, and anthropologists, may have a task here in developing a new
and finer civilization. 32 These efforts, I believe, should not be confined to selected teams of experts but should be incorporated in the
teaching of law for the benefit of those who will practice law in the
future and the ultimate benefit of the public. 3 3

At least a greater

awareness can be created. The existence of double standards in
society is of direct concern to lawyers, just as to anyone else. -4 Of
present situation is largely to the detriment of the male population, a continuation
of the abuses which led in related areas to "anti-heart balm" legislation. See FLA.
STAT. c. 771 (1957).
32BETrrr, op. cit. supra note 9, at 35, 36.
331 am unable to share here the pessimism of Dean David F. Cavers, who believes
that institutional changes will be necessary in our law schools to adjust legal education to the social changes that are constantly accelerated by scientists and engineers. Science, Research, and the Law: Beutel's "Experimental Jurisprudence,"
10 J. LEGAL ED. 162, 188 (1957). With the very little means at hand, and conceding the limitations on research and institutional difficulties, we should be able
to do the first steps now.
34Prof. Louis B. Schwarz believes that no hypocrisy is involved. The test of
criminal law would not be its correlation with actual behavior but its correspondence to behavior ideals. The reports themselves would demonstrate that people
who engage in forbidden practices nevertheless subscribe to the law and morality
which condemn their conduct. This would be only a recognition that there may
be a better way of life than one is personally able to follow in every situation.
Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. Rav. 914 (1948). Query: What is "ideal" and what is
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course, the real difficulty is not in statistics but in the evaluation and
suggestion of positive steps. I cannot exhaust here the alternatives.
Legislative changes may not help in all respects. There may be, for
example, an interrelation between the present trends in our society
towards conformism and the spread of moral double standards. Those
persons seeking anonymity by outwardly conforming to the ultimate
with their neighbors may seek at the same time to regain lost individuality by the practice of double standards. Change of legislation, although desirable, does not necessarily reverse this trend.3 5
Not mere changes of legislation but changes of values and policies
are at stake. This should not frighten us from informing ourselves of
some basic facts, particularly if a major part of the tedious research
is already done. Any attempt toward greater awareness is a giant
step toward possible solutions.

a "better way of life"?
35Substantial legislative changes can hardly be expected in the near future.
Prof. Fowler V. Harper conducted a field research jointly with students of Yale
Law School by means of questionnaires to determine the reaction of the legislature
of "what may be regarded as a typical New England state" to the reports on sexual
behavior discussed here. We may assume that many of the legislators were lawyers.
In spite of the high frequency of extra-marital relations shown, 62.5% answered
affirmatively the question whether a single act of adultery should continue to be
a ground for divorce, 30% said no, and 7.5% did not answer. Only 40% thought
the criminal law penalty for adultery should be reduced (punishable by up to
5 years' confinement in this particular jurisdiction). Only 20% wanted a repeal of
the criminal statute on fornication (punishable by up to 6 months' imprisonment);
57.5% wanted no change in the law on homosexuality and other forms of sodomy,
and only 32.5% thought it should be made less strict (punishable by imprisonment
up to 30 years). One half of the legislators asked thought that studies on sexual
behavior would be of no value to them in their work; 45% thought it would have
value; and 5% "did not think." Book Review, 63 YALE L.J. 895, 899 (1954).
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